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 RISK CONTROL CLAUSES IN INSURANCE LAW— 
LAW REFORM AND THE FUTURE 
Risk control clauses are often used in insurance contracts with a view to preventing
the assured from altering the risk during the currency of the policy. An insurance
warranty is the most commonly used risk prevention clause in practice. Having been
subjected  to  severe  criticisms  for  years,  the  legal  regime  concerning  insurance
warranties  and  other  risk  control  clauses  has  recently  been  revamped  by  the
Insurance Act 2015, which will enter into force in August 2016. This article intends
to elaborate on the appropriateness of the reforms introduced by the 2015 Act from
risk assessment and management perspectives. It is also intended to offer a critical
analysis on the potential impact of the changes on insurance law and practice.    
I. INTRODUCTION 
English insurance law is fundamentally different than continental legal systems in that it
allows a policyholder after attachment of the risk to alter its nature without the consent of the
insurer.1 In practice, however, risk control clauses are often employed to restrict this freedom.
The main objective of a clause of this nature is to ensure that the risk is maintained by the
assured  at  the  same  level  agreed  at  the  inception.  Traditionally,  warranties  are  the  most
common  risk  control  clause2 used  in  insurance  law.3 In  a  technical  sense,  an  insurance
warranty is an undertaking by the assured4 that “some particular thing shall or shall not be
done”,  or  that  “some  condition  shall  be  fulfilled”,5 or  whereby  the  assured  “affirms  or
1  Chief Baron Pollock in Baxendale v. Harvey (1849) 4 H & N 445, at 449 and 452, famously said: “If a person
who insures his life goes up in a balloon, that does not vitiate his policy…. A person who insures may light as
many candles as he please[s] in his house, although each additional candle increases the danger of setting the
house on fire.” Conversely, in German law by virtue of Art. 23–25 of Versicherungsvertragsgesetz (VVG), if
the policyholder increases the risk in any way without the consent of the insurer, the cover ends at once in
respect of any loss “influenced” by the increase, as well as any subsequent loss if the insurer so elects. A similar
outcome follows in French Law by virtue of Art. L 113-2-3 of Code d’assurance.    
2  Other risk control mechanisms often used are: i) condition precedents to liability of the insurer (breach of such
clauses either entitle the insurer to elect to discharge from the contract or prevent the assured from claiming for
a  particular  loss);  ii)  suspensory  provisions  (also  known as  clauses  delimiting  the  risk)  which  set  out  the
circumstances in which the insurer is to be on risk and iii) exclusion clauses.     
3  This is not the only function that an insurance warranty serves. Some warranties (i.e., affirmative warranties)
intend to circumscribe the risk to which the insurer subscribes.     
4  Section 33(1) of the Marine Insurance Act (MIA) 1906.
5  Such warranties relate to facts after the attachment of the policy and are often known as future (or continuing)
warranties. 
negatives the existence of a particular state of facts”.6 Although the legal regime relating to
insurance warranties is set out in the MIA 1906, apart from the principles that are unique to a
marine adventure (e.g., implied warranty of seaworthiness), these principles apply in other
areas of insurance law by analogy.                
Breach of an insurance warranty will have catastrophic consequences from the assured’s
perspective, as it will enable the insurer to discharge itself from liability automatically from
the moment of breach even if the breach is remedied before any loss arises.7 This reflects the
fact that liability of an insurer was viewed as an obligation “dependent” on fulfilment of a
warranty by the assured, back in the eighteenth century by Lord Mansfield.8 Over the years,
the legal  regime concerning insurance warranties has attracted relentless criticism both in
judicial9 and  academic  circles.10 The  most  prominent  problem identified  with  the law on
warranties is that it permits the insurer to escape liability for technical breaches that have
nothing to do with the loss in question11 or that have been remedied prior to the loss.12 The
remedy for breach of a warranty, automatic discharge from liability, is also often considered
to be disproportionately severe, in the light of the fact that the function of most warranties is
to prevent any alteration of risk after the inception of the policy,  and that in most  cases
alterations made in the risk do not have a lasting impact. For example, when a warranty that
requires the insured premises to have a burglar alarm in a working condition is breached,
obviously an alteration in the insured risk occurs; but in cases where the alteration lasts only a
temporary  period  of  time  or  when it  does  not  create  any dramatic  consequences  for  the
6  A warranty of this nature is known as an affirmative warranty or a warranty that relates to a period before the
attachment of the risk.
7  See, ss. 33(3) and 34(2) of the Marine Insurance Act (MIA) 1906.
8  De Hanh v. Hartley (1786) 1 T.R. 343. The contractual status of warranties and the role they play in insurance
law have been described in a categorical fashion by Lord Goff in Bank of Nova Scotia v. Hellenic Mutual War
Risks Association (Bermuda) Ltd (The Good Luck)  [1992] 1 AC 233, at 262–263: “... if a promissory warranty
is not complied with, the insurer is discharged from liability as from the date of the breach of warranty, for the
simple reason that fulfilment of warranty is a condition precedent to the liability of the insurer. This moreover
reflects the fact that the insurer only accepts the risk provided that the warranty is fulfilled.”
9  Lord Griffits in  Forsikringsaktielselskapet Vesta v.  Butcher [1989] AC 852, at 893–4, famously said: “It is
one of the less attractive features of English insurance law that breach of a warranty in an insurance policy can
be relied upon to defeat a claim under the policy even if there is no causal connection between the breach and
the loss.”
10  J. Birds, “The Effect of Breach of Warranty” (1991) L.Q.R. 540; T.J. Schoenbaum, “Warranties in the Law of
Marine Insurance: Some Suggestions for Reform of English and American Law” (1999) Tulane M.L.J. 267; J.
Hare, “The Omnipotent Warranty: England v. The World” in M. Huybrechts, E.V. Hooydonk and C. Dieryck
(eds.),  Marine Insurance at the Turn of the Millennium (Vol 2), (Antwerp, 1999), 37 and B. Soyer, “Marine
Warranties: Old Rules for the New Millennium?” in D.R. Thomas (ed.), Modern Law of Marine Insurance (Vol
2), (London, 2002), 161.
11 For example, if the assured under a motor policy warrants that he will maintain the insured vehicle in an
“efficient” or “roadworthy” condition, the insurer who proves that the vehicle was not in that state at the time of
the loss will have a defence to a claim arising out of an accident involving the insured vehicle, without going so
far  to  prove  that  the  poor  condition  of  the  vehicle  caused  or  contributed  to  the  accident.  See,  Conn v.
Westminster Insurance Co [1966] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 407.         
12  In De Hahn v. Hartley (1786) 1 T.R. 343, when the insured vessel commenced the intended voyage without
having the warranted number of crew on board, the insurer was held not to be liable although the warranted
number of crew had been recruited before the vessel sailed on the leg of the voyage during which the casualty
occurred.
insurer, one finds it difficult to justify why the assured is deprived of his insurance cover
automatically by operation of law without having the opportunity to rectify the breach.
Against this background, it comes as no surprise that reforming this area of law has been
on the agenda for some time.13 The end product of the most recent reform initiative led by the
English and Scottish Law Commission (the Law Commissions)14 is the Insurance Act 2015,
which received Royal Assent on 12 February 2015 and will enter into force on 12 September
2016. The Act will modify key aspects of the warranty regime15 but also will have a serious
impact on how other risk control clauses, such as condition precedents—clauses delimiting
the  risk  and  exceptions—operate;  as  the  draftsmen  have  appreciated  that  restricting  the
reform to  the  warranty  regime  would  simply  encourage  the  insurers  to  utilise  other  risk
control mechanisms to achieve the same result prior to the reform, hence undermining the
changes introduced.         
In a nutshell, the Insurance Act 2015 will introduce the following changes to the regime
that regulates risk control clauses: 
i) Section 10 of the Insurance Act 2015 abolishes any rule of law to the effect that
breach of a warranty in a contract  of insurance results  in the discharge of the
insurer’s liability under the contract. Instead, in case of breach of a warranty the
liability of the insurer will be suspended but the risk reattaches once the breach is
remedied.
ii)    Section 11 of the Act stipulates that if compliance with a term of a contract of
insurance would tend to reduce the risk of i) loss of a particular kind, ii) loss at a
particular location and iii) loss at a particular time, a breach of that term would not
suspend liability if the assured shows that non-compliance with the term could not
have increased the risk of loss which actually occurred in the circumstances in
which  it  occurred.  The objective  of  this  provision is  to  prevent  insurers  from
denying  a  claim that  arises  during  the  period  when a warranty is  breached if
13  In  1980,  the  Law  Commission  prepared  a  report  advocating  a  reform  of  the  warranty  regime:  Law
Commission Report No. 104,  Insurance Law—Non-Disclosure and Breach of Warranty, Cmnd. 8064 (1980).
The striking feature of this report is the fact that marine, aviation and transport insurance has been excluded
from the scope of a possible reform. Although a draft Bill was introduced to the Parliament for the reform of the
regime regulating non-marine warranties, the draft Bill was withdrawn after the Government reached agreement
with the Association of British Insurers (ABI) that ABI would take up the Law Commission’s recommendations
on a  self-regulatory  basis.  Extending  the  debate  to  marine  and  commercial  insurance,  the  Australian  Law
Reform Commission (ALRC) in 2001 proposed substantial amendments to the Australian Marine Insurance Act
1909 (which is the equivalent of the MIA 1906), including the regime regulating marine insurance warranties;
see: Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of the Marine Insurance Act 1909 (Report 91, 2001). As of
today, no action has been taken with regard to the proposals made in this Report.               
14  The process  commenced in 2006 with a scoping paper.  In  the course of 9 years  a series of Issues  and
Consultation Papers have been published by the Law Commissions. The exercise has also led to the enactment
of the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012, which has fundamentally overhauled the
pre-contractual duty of utmost good faith as it had previously applied to consumer insurance contracts. This Act
came into force on 6 April 2013 (SI 405/2013).
15  The Act also introduces changes with regard to pre-contractual  good faith duties of the assured in non-
consumer insurance contracts and also stipulates the remedies available to an insurer in case of submission of a
fraudulent claim in consumer and non-consumer insurance contracts. These aspects of the 2015 Act will not be
deliberated in this article.   
compliance  with  the  warranty  would  not  have  had  any  impact  on  the  loss
occurring. This provides an additional protection to the assured in cases where the
warranty  breached  was  not  designed  to  deal  with  the  risk  which  caused  a
particular loss. This provision will apply not only to warranties as traditionally
understood but also to other risk control clauses. 
iii)  For consumer policies, the rules mentioned above will be mandatory in the sense
that a contract term which would put the assured in a worse position than under
the Act will not be permitted.16 For non-consumer policies, the relevant provisions
of  the  Insurance  Act  2015 can  be  excluded  subject  to  important  transparency
safeguards as set out in s. 17.
iv) The use of “basis of contract” clauses in non-consumer insurance contracts which
convert the policyholder’s answers and declarations into contractual warranties is
abolished by s. 9(2).17        
The objective of this article is two-fold. In the first instance,  it  is intended to discuss
whether the changes introduced by the Insurance Act 2015 enjoy a theoretical backing from
the perspective of risk assessment. Then evaluating the changes from a critical standpoint, it
is intended to ponder whether they would work in practice. In the course of this analysis, the
author with the aid of hypothetical examples will try to identify legal problems that might
occupy the courts in the years to come following the entry of the Act in force.        
II. ALTERING THE CONSEQUENCE OF BREACH OF AN INSURANCE
WARRANTY
The main  change that  has  been introduced by s.  10 of the Insurance Act 2015 is  an
alteration of the legal consequence for breach of a warranty so that the cover is suspended for
the duration of the breach, and liability of the insurer is restored if the breach is remedied.
This is not a novel solution18 and it represents the position in some American states.19 
Taking into account the rationale for incorporating warranties into insurance contracts
and their function in risk assessment and management, it is submitted that the new remedy
introduced, namely suspension of cover, is justifiable.  Take, for example,  a warranty that
relates to future conduct of the assured requiring him to ensure regular surveys of security
systems are carried out every two months at the insured premises and any recommendations
made by the surveyor are complied with. If surveys are not carried out as stipulated, the cover
16  Section 15 of the Insurance Act 2015.
17  Section 6(2) of the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representation) Act 2012 abolishes the use of such
clauses in consumer insurance contracts.    
18  This was put forward as one of the potential solutions to the problem in B. Soyer,  Warranties in Marine
Insurance, 2nd ed., (London, 2006), at p. 213.  
19  Fireman’s  Fund Insurance Co v.  Cox 742 F Supp. 609 (M.D. Fla.  1989) (Florida law);  Lineas Aereas
Colombians  Expresas v.  Travelers  Fire  Insurance  Co  257 F.  2d  150  (5th Cir.  1958)  (Louisiana  law)  and
Commercial Union Insurance Co of N.Y. v. Daniels 343 F. Supp. 674 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (Texas law).       
will be suspended. The purpose of incorporating this kind of warranty into the contract is to
protect the insurer against alteration of the insured risk; so it is understandable that no cover
will  be  available  from  the  moment  the  risk  is  altered.  However,  if  the  survey  is  later
completed with some delay and all recommendations are complied with, from the insurer’s
perspective the risk is normally reduced to the level that he was content with at the time when
he agreed to  undertake  the  risk.  Therefore,  from the  perspective  of  risk management  no
objection can be raised by the insurer to the prospect of him coming back onto the risk. 
The position is entirely different when dealing with affirmative warranties. By a warranty
of this type the assured affirms or negatives the existence of a particular state of facts at the
time of contracting. Imagine that the policy contains a warranty to the effect that a specific
type of security system is in place to protect the insured premises. If this does not hold true at
the time when the policy attaches, the cover will be suspended from the outset without having
any possibility to remedy this kind of breach.20 It is submitted that this is in accord with the
function that warranties of this type perform. An affirmative warranty assists an underwriter
in rating the scope of the proposed insured risk. The insurer agrees to undertake the risk
relying on the contractual undertaking that forms the basis of such a warranty.  In case of
breach,  therefore,  the insurer is  misled  as to  the extent  of the risk and it  is  in  that  case
understandable why he will not come on the risk at all.                       
However,  it  is  apparent  that  some  future  warranties  due  to  their  nature  cannot  be
remedied.  For  example,  a  warranty  requiring  the  insured  corporation  to  maintain
confidentiality in their business dealings cannot be remedied once confidentiality has been
compromised. Likewise, in some instances it may not be possible to bring the risk back to the
level which the insurer was content with simply by remedying the breach. Put differently, in
some instances an alteration in the insured risk caused by the breach continues to have an
adverse impact on the risk even though the breach is remedied. Imagine, for example, that the
assured is in breach of a warranty that obliges the insured vessel not to undertake towage or
salvage services under a contract previously arranged. As soon as the insured vessel engages
in such a service the cover will be suspended and remain so until the operation is completed;
but in its unmodified form under s. 10, the insurer is expected to come on the risk as soon as
the pre-arranged towage or salvage service comes to an end. If the insured vessel at a later
stage develops a structural defect attributable to the contractual salvage operation she has
undertaken under a prearranged contract and as a result of this sinks in moderate weather
conditions, it is evident that the risk has not in that case been reduced to the level which the
insurer expected it to be, despite the fact that the breach has been remedied. 
The fact that in some cases remedying the breach will not necessarily reduce the risk to
the level acceptable to the insurer has been appreciated by the draftsmen who decided to
stipulate in s. 10(2) that the insurer will have no liability in respect of any loss “occurring, or
attributable to something happening, after a warranty in the contract has been breached but
before  the  breach  has  been  remedied.”  The  words  used  in  this  sub-section  “something
happening” invites a close scrutiny and it is likely that the insurer needs to establish a causal
relationship between an event occurring during the period of suspension and loss that arises
after the cover is reinstated. It is submitted that this will not be a straightforward exercise.
Imagine  that  the  motor  insurance  policy  contains  a  warranty  indicating  that  the  insured
20  Technically speaking, breach will result in the insurer never coming on risk, as compliance with this kind of
warranty will be viewed as a condition contingent to the attachment of the risk. See comments made by Lord
Mansfield in De Hahn v. Hartley (1786) 1 T.R. 343, at 345–6, to that effect. It is submitted that the contractual
analysis will remain the same despite the change in the proposed remedy.   
vehicle will not be used in racing competitions. If the vehicle is used on a Sunday for racing
purposes and in the week following the race an engine breakdown arises, to deny liability the
insurer will be required to prove that “something happened” during the race, for example, the
engine endured excessive pressure, which led to the mechanical breakdown after the cover
was reinstated. The fact that the insured vehicle took part in a race on its own is not enough to
afford a defence to the insurer under s. 10(2).  In other words, it is essential to demonstrate
that the risk has acquired new characteristics as a result of the breach, and the loss that results
after the breach is remedied is attributable to these new characteristics. 
A very interesting question in this context is at what point the breach is deemed to be
“remedied” for the purposes of s. 10 of the Insurance Act 2015. The general presumption
adopted by s. 10(5)(b) is that for most warranties a breach is remedied if the assured ceases to
be in breach of the warranty. What is apparent is that this provision does not invite any causal
examination, and in some cases this could work against the insurer. Let us assume that a
marine policy contains a warranty prohibiting the insured vessel from traveling through an
area where attacks from pirates is very common. The insured vessel, nevertheless, travels
through this area and comes out of it suffering no loss (e.g.,  no attack from pirates). The
cover is suspended during the period when the vessel is in the prohibited area but under s.
10(5)(b) it will be reinstated as soon as she leaves the area prohibited by the warranty. Also
assume that the outcome of the breach committed is to shorten the voyage by a few days—as
navigating  through  the  prohibited  area  proves  to  be  a  more  direct  route  for  the  voyage
contemplated. If after coming out of the prohibited area, the insured vessel finds herself in the
middle of a storm and is lost, the insurer will be liable even though it is evident that there is a
kind of causal link between breach of the warranty (i.e., shortening of the voyage), and the
loss resulting; since getting caught in the middle of the storm would have not occurred if the
area with piracy risk had been avoided,  as this  would have added to the duration of the
voyage.  On the  other  hand, one appreciates  that  introducing a  causal  test  in  this  context
would  have  created  additional  complications  leading  to  a  degree  of  uncertainty.  The
draftsmen perhaps found it appropriate that the cost of avoiding any uncertainty should be
borne by insurers in cases where breach, even though remedied, changes the course of events
prospectively leading to a loss. 
    
     That said, a very different approach has been taken with regard to warranties that
require by an ascertainable time that something is to be done (or not done), or a condition is
to be fulfilled, or something is (or is not) to be the case. For this kind of warranty, a breach is
deemed to be remedied if the risk to which the warranty relates becomes essentially the same
as that originally contemplated by the parties.21 This will require the courts to consider the
purpose for which the warranty was inserted in the contract and analyse whether that purpose
has been frustrated as a result of the breach which was later remedied. If so, any loss that
arises will be avoided. Conversely, if as a result of the actions taken to remedy the breach of
warranty, the original purpose is still in substance filled and the risk profile is restored to that
which the insurer was content with at the outset, then the breach is deemed to be remedied
under s. 10(5)(a) of the Act. With this formulation it is acknowledged that in the context of
time-specific warranties breach of a warranty in certain occasions will have an everlasting
impact and accordingly it will not be possible to bring the risk profile to a level as it stood at
the  outset.22 In  a  case where  the policy contains  a  warranty stipulating  that  “the insured
21  See, s. 10 (5)(a) and 10(6) of the Insurance Act 2015. 
22 As discussed above, a similar situation might arise with regard to other warranties—the breach might change
the course of events and lead to loss even though it is remedied. However, by virtue of s. 10(5)(b) the risk will
be  reinstated  and  the  loss  will  be  recoverable  in  such  cases.  It  has  been  assumed  by  the  draftsmen  that
premises  shall  not  be  left  unoccupied  more  than  21  days  in  a  year”,  the  cover  will  be
suspended on the 22nd day when the premises remained unoccupied. Let us imagine that the
assured remedies this  breach 45 days  later by ensuring that the premises are occupied as
originally stipulated during the remaining part of the policy period. Keeping the premises
unoccupied for 45 days more than initially envisaged by the parties could potentially have
drastic  consequences.  For  example,  a  lengthy period  of  vacancy might  make the  insured
property vulnerable by making it a target for burglars operating in the area. In that case, even
though the breach is remedied, one could argue that the commercial purpose of the relevant
warranty is frustrated as a result of the breach so that it cannot be remedied. On the other
hand, this will not be the case if the contract contains a warranty requiring the fire alarm at
the insured premises to be inspected every 30 days. If the inspection is delayed by a few days,
during that period there will be no cover; but as soon as an inspection is carried out, the risk
is reduced to the level acceptable to the insurer at the outset. Hence, cover will be available
from the moment the delayed inspection is carried out, as the breach will be deemed to have
been  remedied  from  that  point  onwards.  The  special  regime  created  for  time-specific
warranties takes into account the fact that the time factor in such warranties is critical, and
that  non-compliance  within a  specified  period could potentially  alter  the risk beyond the
bounds of acceptability from the insurer’s perspective.                                           
 Lastly,  it  will  be  appropriate  to  comment  briefly  on potential  implications  of  the
introduction of suspension of cover for breach of insurance warranties, as the new remedy on
various legal doctrines. One consequence of the current remedy of automatic discharge is that
any waiver by the insurer should take the form of “estoppel” rather than “election”.  It is
believed that the insurer has no election to make given that the breach of warranty discharges
him from liability automatically.23 Rooted in the law of equity, waiver by estoppel is a rather
different concept which requires unequivocal representation on the part of the insurer that he
would not endorse his right of relying on automatic discharge as a remedy. It is also essential
to show that the assured has relied upon this representation and it would be inequitable for
this promise to be withdrawn.24 Given that under s. 10 of the Act a breach of warranty would
merely suspend the cover,  this  means that  “waiver by election” will  be available  for the
assured given that the cover will remain, enabling the insurer to make a choice between two
alternative  and  inconsistent  causes  of  action  open  to  him.  Furthermore,  in  appropriate
instances waiver by estoppel will also be available. 
On the other hand, adoption of the new remedy is unlikely to lead to any change in law
and practice when it  comes to the obligation of the assured to make premium payments.
Currently, in cases where a warranty that needs to be complied with at one certain point after
the  attachment  of  the  risk  (e.g.,  a  navigation  warranty)  is  breached,  the  premium is  not
remedying the breach is capable of bringing the risk to the original  level, perhaps for the sake of avoiding
uncertainty.      
23  This was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Kosmar Villa Holidays Plc v. Trustees of Syndicate 1243 [2008]
EWCA Civ 147; [2008] Lloyd’s Rep. I.R. 489 at [38].  
24  The elements of waiver by estoppel in this context have been summarised by deputy judge Sheer QC in HIH
Casualty & General Insurance Ltd v.  Axa Corporate Solutions [2002] Lloyd’s Rep. I.R. 325, at [24], in the
following fashion: “Waiver by estoppel or promissory estoppel, as it is more commonly described, involves a
clear and unequivocal representation that the reinsurer (or insurer) will not stand on its right to treat the cover as
having been discharged on which the insurer (or insured) has relied in circumstances in which it  would be
inequitable to allow the reinsurer (or insurer) to resile from its representation.”
returnable (or remains payable if not paid in full at the outset) as long as the risk insured
against is entire and indivisible.25 Lord Goff was explicit on this point in The Good Luck:26     
It is possible that there may be obligations of the assured under the contract which will
survive the discharge of the insurer from liability, as for example a continuing liability to
pay a premium.                         
The  position  is  different  if  a  warranty  that  needs  to  be  complied  with  before  the
attachment of the risk (e.g., an affirmative warranty) is breached. In that case, the insurer in
the absence of fraud or illegality is expected to return the premium to the assured; as the risk
never attaches, and, borrowing the wording of s. 84(1) of the MIA 1906, the consideration for
the payment of the premium totally fails. 
Replacing the remedy of automatic discharge with the remedy of suspension of cover
should not have any impact on the relevant legal principles discussed above. Breach of a
navigation warranty will suspend the cover, but given that the insurer has been on risk unless
the risk insured against is apportionable, the premium agreed will not be returnable if paid in
advance or will  still  remain payable if  part  of it  is not paid in advance.  Similarly,  if  the
warranty  breached  is  an  affirmative  warranty,  the  insurer  will  not  come  on  risk  at  all,
meaning  that  the  premium,  if  paid  in  advance,  needs  to  be  returned  for  total  failure  of
consideration. That said, it is perfectly possible that the contract might contain a clause that in
the event of irremediable breach, cancellation or termination, the premium will be returned
pro-rata. A clause of that nature is often incorporated into commercial insurance contracts,
and if it  is made a part  of the contract,  the assured might  be able to recover part  of the
premium even if a warranty that needs to be complied with at one certain point after the
attachment of the risk is breached.         
III.  LOSS OCCURRING DURING THE PERIOD OF SUSPENSION DUE TO
BREACH OF A WARRANTY (TERM) UNRELATED TO THE LOSS 
Even  though  altering  the  remedy  for  breach  of  an  insurance  warranty  provides  an
increased level of protection for the assured, the proposed solution is still a crude one, and it
remains a realistic possibility that the assured will be deprived of his cover in cases where
there  is  no  causal  connection  between  the  warranty  (term)  breached  and  the  loss.  For
instance, if the warranty requires the assured to keep the burglar alarm at the insured premises
in operation throughout the policy period, the assured will not be able to recover for loss
emerging from fire arising at a time when the burglar alarm was out of order. Section 11 of
the Insurance Act has been designed to improve the position of the assured in such a case.27
It,  therefore, stipulates that the assured will be indemnified for a loss occurring at a time
when a warranty (or term) is not complied with if i) compliance with the warranty (or term)
in question would tend to reduce the risk of loss of a particular kind, loss at a particular
location or loss at a particular time; and ii) the assured demonstrates that non-compliance
25  See, s. 84(2) of the MIA 1906.
26  [1992] 1 A.C. 233, at 263.
27  It is worth noting that this provision was omitted from the Bill as first presented to Parliament even though it
formed  part  of  the  Final  Report  published  in  July  2014:  (Insurance  Contract  Law:  Business  Disclosure;
Warranties; Insurer’s Remedies for Fraudulent Claims; and Late Payment, Cm 8898, SG/2014/131). A slightly
amended  version  of  the  clause  was  put  to  the  Committee  in  December  2014  shortly  before  the  hearings
commenced and it was strongly embraced by the Committee.  
with the warranty (or term)  could not  have increased  the risk of the loss which actually
occurred in the circumstances in which it occurred. 
It is envisaged that s. 11 can be utilised by the assured in cases where the loss arises
during the period of breach of a warranty (or term). To seek refuge in this section, the assured
in the light of the loss arising must first establish that the warranty (or term) that is breached
is intended to reduce the risk of loss of a particular type or at a particular location or at a
particular time. The test that is introduced here is an objective one and it essentially attempts
to identify whether compliance with the warranty (or term) be thought to reduce the chances
of the particular type of loss being suffered. Turning to the example above, the assured would
possibly be able to establish that the relevant warranty would objectively tend to reduce the
risk of break-in (and related events such as arson and vandalism). This will mean that the
insurer’s liability in respect of break-in would be suspended during the period of breach. If,
however, a loss arises as a result of fire that is not connected to unauthorised entry into the
premises,  that  loss  will  be  covered,  as  the  assured  in  all  probability  will  be  able  to
demonstrate  that  non-compliance  with  the  warranty  (i.e.,  the  burglar  alarm not  being  in
operation) could not have increased the risk of loss caused by fire.   
The  purpose  of  introducing  this  convoluted  test  by s.  11  is  to  prevent  insurers  from
relying on breaches of irrelevant warranties—that is, where the type of loss which occurred is
not  one  which  compliance  with  the  warranty  or  term  could  have  had  any  chance  of
preventing. In doing so, the Law Commissions were determined to avoid being drawn into an
inquiry  involving  a  causation  test.28 However,  it  is  submitted  that  the  alternative  test
introduced  will  inevitably  create  uncertainties,  as  identifying  whether  compliance  with  a
warranty (or term) could have increased the risk of the loss which actually occurred in the
circumstances in which it occurred might not often be a straightforward task. Imagine that an
insurance policy on a restaurant contains a warranty requiring that all waste or refuse outside
the building be stored in non-combustible lidded and lockable containers. Also, assume that a
number  of containers  in  use are  high-density plastic  and one evening a  fire  starts  in  the
kitchen as a result of an electrical fault destroying the restaurant completely. The assured in
that case would tend to argue that the warranty in question tends to reduce the risk of loss
caused as a result of fire occasioned from any of the containers outside the building, so that
cover is suspended for this type of risks. The insurer, on the other hand, is likely to contend
that the particular warranty tends to reduce the risk of loss by fire generally, and given that
the cause of the loss in this case is fire, the burden passes to the assured to prove that non-
compliance with the warranty (i.e.,  not using non-combustible  containers) could not have
increased the risk of loss which actually occurred in the manner in which it occurred. Other
examples  can  easily  be  provided,  but  what  this  exercise  reveals  is  that  as  far  as  most
warranties are concerned, the proposal would necessitate  detailed factual enquiry into the
purpose of the term in question. It is a safe bet to assume that the assured in most instances
would be tempted to argue that compliance with a particular warranty would tend to reduce
the risk of loss in a narrow fashion, with insurers taking a different stance on the matter.29
One cannot help thinking that the effect of s. 11 will be to introduce causation by the back
28  The introduction of a  causal  link requirement  in this context between breach  and loss is  deemed to be
problematic.  M. Clarke, “Insurance Warranties: The Absolute End?” [2007] LMCLQ 474, at p 487, said: “...
may it be observed in passing that the history of English law on questions of causation is not encouraging.”
29 The Law Commissions are fully aware of the difficulties that this change might introduce and admit that there
might be borderline cases that turn on their particular facts (Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission,
Insurance Contract Law; the Business Insured’s Duty of Disclosure and the Law of Warranties (LCCP No 204;
ScLCDP No 155: 2012) at p 186). With respect, it is submitted that they have considerably downplayed the
difficulties that can arise with respect to several types of promissory warranties.
door, but time will show the true impact of this provision. It is a genuine concern that the test
introduced has the potential to increase transaction and litigation costs. 
                           
  A  significant  difference  between  s.  11  and  s.  10  is  that  the  latter  applies  only  to
warranties  as  traditionally  understood,  whilst  the  remit  of  s.  11  is  much  wider  and it  is
intended to apply to any term which is designed with the intention of reducing the risk of a
particular type of loss, or loss at a particular location or time. This is a sensible approach, as
other contractual  terms such as condition precedents,  suspensory provisions or exclusions
could perform a risk-controlling function similar to insurance warranties. If a reform were to
be restricted  to warranties,  the changes adopted could have been undermined by insurers
introducing similar risk control mechanisms detrimental to the interest of the assured under a
different label. For example, instead of stipulating with a warranty that a burglar alarm at the
insured  premises  must  be  in  operation  at  all  times,  the  insurers  could  have  achieved  an
outcome that is similar to the current position by stipulating that “losses caused when the
burglar alarm is not in operation are excluded from cover.” In that case, in the absence of s.
11 the assured would fail to recover for a loss arising when the burglar alarm was not in
operation even though the loss was occasioned from an unrelated peril such as flooding. The
extension of s. 11 to similar types of terms is, therefore, a positive development and intends
to  offer  a  more  holistic  approach  to  risk  management  clauses  in  English  insurance  law,
discarding technical  categorisation  of  contractual  terms.  It  should  also be noted that  this
imposes a restriction on freedom of contract in consumer insurance. However, it  is worth
remembering that in non-consumer insurance it is possible to contract out of the new regime,
thus giving full effect to freedom of contract.30         
                 
As a final point, it is essential to identify boundaries and precise impact of s. 11 upon
different types of clauses and obligations.  It is abundantly clear that this section will not
affect  terms  which have  no bearing  on the risk of  loss.  The most  obvious  example  is  a
premium warranty31 whereby the assured warrants to make payment of the premium by a
particular date. If the payment is not made by the agreed date, the cover will be suspended
and remain so until the breach is rectified. If loss arises before the breach is rectified, the
assured will not be able to seek indemnity.32 Equally, the section will not apply to affirmative
warranties given that they are not aimed at a specific type of loss and used for the purposes of
describing  the  risk generally  at  the  outset.  For  example,  if  a  warranty  in  a  yacht  policy
stipulates that the person identified as the master of the yacht passed formal examinations, the
cover will be suspended from the outset if he does not have such qualifications, and it will be
immaterial whether a loss arises later for reasons associated with the master not having the
required qualifications or otherwise. 
More challenging questions are likely to arise on the issue of whether a warranty (or
term) serves the purpose of describing the limits of the cover as a whole, or whether it is a
(warranty) term aiming to reduce a particular risk-increasing event/circumstance. The former
type of warranty (term) is excluded from the application of s. 11 on the premise that such a
term will have a general limiting effect not linked to a specific risk.33 Put differently,  the
function of a term of that nature is to assist risk assessment and hence it relates to the contract
30  This point will be further deliberated below in IV.
31 For a case concerning a premium warranty see,  JA Chapman & Co Ltd v.  Kadirga Denizcilik ve Ticaret
[1998] Lloyd’s Rep. IR 377. Such warranties are occasionally used in commercial insurance policies in order to
ensure that premium payments are made in a timely manner.  
32  A similar outcome will follow in a case like Overseas Commodities Ltd v. Style [1958] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 546,
where it was warranted that the insured cargo (tins of canned pork)  was marked by the manufacturer with a
code for verification of date of manufacture.    
(and risk) generally. In case of its breach, therefore, the risk assessment undertaken by the
insurer at the outset is in tatters. That explains why it is pointless to enter into any debate as
to whether or not non-compliance could have increased a particular risk in the manner in
which a loss occurred.  Consider a warranty that the vessel remains at all times during the
duration of the cover with a particular classification society. This warranty clearly goes to the
definition of the risk, and in case of non-compliance all coverage should be suspended for the
duration of the breach. Similarly, if a term stipulates that the vehicle is insured “for pleasure
purposes only”,  at  a period when the vehicle is not used for pleasure purposes the cover
should be suspended as during that period the risk originally undertaken by the insurer is
altered dramatically.    
           
So far so good. However, it is not going to be plain sailing all the way. There is little
doubt that a clause that requires the vehicles owned by the assured company to be kept “in a
roadworthy condition at all times” aims to reduce the risks associated with using vehicles that
are not roadworthy. If a loss is caused when the vehicle is used in an unroadworthy state,
there will be an inquiry by virtue of 11(3) as to whether non-compliance could have increased
the risk of the loss which actually occurred in the manner in which it occurred. However,
what happens if the same policy states on the front page under the heading “risk definition”
that: “This policy applies only when the insured vehicle is kept in a roadworthy condition”?
The insurer, in that case, would be able to argue at least that this is a term defining the risk as
a whole and s. 11 has no role to play. One should not be surprised to see an increase in the
use of this kind of alternative formulation instead of promissory warranties by the insurers in
the future after the Insurance Act 2015 comes into force. When an issue of this nature reaches
the court, it will be rather interesting to see what stance the judiciary will take. Essentially,
the issue here is a matter of construction. The language used will have a role to play but “the
factual matrix” cannot be ignored.34 The changes introduced to the current legal system by the
Insurance Act 2015 will form part of the legal matrix, and it is possible that courts would
appreciate the fact that the principal objective behind reallocating this kind of risk control
clauses into the part of the contract that deals with risk definition is to sidestep the potential
impact of s. 11 of the Act. Particularly, in the context of commercial insurance contracts there
is no reason why the courts will not embrace the fact that the intention of the parties was
changing the nature of the term with a view to achieving a particular outcome (or avoiding an
outcome stipulated  by the Insurance Act 2015).  If  courts  fail  to  appreciate  the conscious
decision taken by the parties in reclassifying such clauses as risk defining clauses, there is a
risk that this will be viewed as an attempt to rewrite the bargain for the parties, which is
permissible only if the literal meaning of the words leads to commercial absurdity;35 but that
is hardly the case here, given that defining the limits of the cover making the cover available
only when the vehicle  is  roadworthy is  not  an outcome that  defies  commercial  common
sense. It goes without saying that the assured is likely to bring a counter argument to the
effect that adopting a purposive approach, the above mentioned clause should be viewed as a
risk control clause rather than a risk defining clause in order not to present an opportunity to
insurers to bypass  the effect of the legislation by playing on the wording. That  is also a
33  Insurance Contract Law: Business Disclosure; Warranties; Insurer’s Remedies for Fraudulent Claims; and 
Late Payment, Cm 8898, SG/2014/131, at para. 18–35.
34  Especially in the light of the statement of Lord Hoffmann in Investor Compensation Scheme Ltd v.  West
Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 W.L.R. 896, at 912–13.
35  Rainy Sky SA v. Kookmin Bank [2011] U.K.S.C. 50; [2012] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 34 at [21], Lord Clarke speaking
for the entire court commented: “The language used by the parties will often have more than one potential
meaning… If  there  are  two possible constructions,  the court  is  entitled to  prefer  the construction which is
consistent with business common sense and to reject the other.”
plausible argument that could find a receptive ear, especially in the context of a consumer
insurance policy.                         
IV. CONTRACTING OUT
By virtue of s. 15, a contractual term that would put the assured in a worse position than
under the Insurance Act 2015 is not permitted for consumer policies. On the other hand, with
an exception aside36 in non-consumer policies the parties should be free to contract out of the
provisions of the Act37 subject to transparency safeguards as set out in s. 17. Party autonomy
is at the heart of English commercial law, and ability to alter default rules and respond to
needs of the assured and changes that occur in law and practice have enabled the market, in
particular in the fields of marine energy and transport,  to flourish and establish itself as a
leading insurance centre over the course of the last decade. That being the case, it would have
been a huge blow for the non-consumer market had the Act introduced any constraint on
party autonomy. Also, there are good reasons justifying treatment of non-consumer policies
different than treatment of consumer ones. Commercial risks often involve a much greater
variety of unusual risks than those covered by consumer insurance, making it essential from a
risk  management  perspective  to  make  use  of  risk  control  tailor-made  clauses.  Take  for
example, an insurance policy providing cover against loss of business as a result of a blow-
out in an offshore oil-well.  The risk is so different than the risk an insurer providing car
insurance undertakes, and to ensure that it is retained and managed in accordance with the
expectations of an insurer it is vital to provide the parties with the utmost degree of freedom
of contract. Also, in non-commercial insurance market the bargaining position of the parties
is more balanced, making it rather difficult for the insurers to exploit the vulnerability of the
assureds  by insisting  on terms  detrimental  to  the  interests  of  the  insurer.  Of course,  the
balance is tilted in favour of insurers in cases where they contract with small or medium sized
businesses but, as will be evaluated in the following paragraph, this does not cause serious
difficulties for such assureds, as inequalities in the bargaining positions of the parties will be
taken into account in applying the transparency requirements, making it rather difficult for
the insurers to contract out of the default regime. Also, it is the case that the insurers still have
an inherent advantage, as they are in a position to know about the niceties of insurance law
more  than  an  average  assured  would;  but  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  intensive  use  of
professional intermediaries when placing commercial risks helps enormously in bridging the
knowledge gap.
In non-consumer policies a term that puts the assured in a worse position than he would
be under the Insurance Act 201538 is enforceable if the insurer takes sufficient steps to draw
disadvantageous term to the attention of the assured before the contract is entered into,39 and
if such term is clear and unambiguous as to its effect.40 The first limb of the transparency
requirements is drafted very broadly, taking into account the fact that the characteristics of
the assured of the kind in question and the circumstances of the transaction will be decisive in
determining whether the disadvantageous term has been sufficiently brought to the attention
36  It is not permitted to use basis of contract clauses even in non-consumer insurance policies (s. 16(1)).  
37  Section 16(2) of the Insurance Act 2015.   
38  The Act refers to a term of this nature as a disadvantageous term.
39  Section 17(2) of the Insurance Act 2015.
40  Section 17(3) of the Insurance Act 2015.
of the assured at the outset. Therefore, in the context of a marine policy negotiated through
several brokers, attracting the attention of the placing broker to the disadvantageous terms
should be deemed sufficient.41 Conversely, if a small business owner obtains insurance cover
for his premises online,  it  might not be adequate to satisfy the transparency requirements
simply by offering the assured the opportunity to view under a window all of the standard
terms containing disadvantageous ones.  
  
Turning to the need to have clear and unambiguous wording, it is debateable whether it
would be sufficient to state that “s. 10 and 11 of the Insurance Act 2015 do not apply to this
contract” or whether it will be necessary to stipulate specifically the legal effect of this: that
is,  that breach of any warranty under this  policy will  discharge the insurer from liability
automatically regardless of whether there is any causal link between the breach and the loss,
and regardless of whether the breach is material to the loss or not. At their final report, the
Law Commissions expressed the view that it would normally be necessary to stipulate the
legal  effect  of not  making certain  sections  of  the Act  applicable  for  the purposes  of the
present contract.42 In the light of the fact that in determining whether the requirement of this
sub-section is satisfied, it is essential to take into account the characteristics of the insured
persons  of  the  kind  in  question  and  the  circumstances  of  the  transaction,43 the  author
disrespectfully disagrees with the view expressed by the Law Commissions. For example, in
a market where standard clauses are often used, such as marine insurance, given the fact that
a typical assured is likely to be a corporate entity who is assisted by in-house lawyers and
brokers, it is difficult to see why a mere reference indicating the provisions of the Act that are
displaced should not be adequate. On the other hand, if the assured is a small-sized business
obtaining cover through the Internet, it is appropriate that the insurer should spell out in a
clear fashion the consequences for displacing the relevant provisions of the Act. It is expected
that disputes on the transparency requirements might arise after the Act comes into force, but
in all probability such disputes will settle rather quickly once a judicial view on the matter is
expressed.                    
            
V. BASIS OF CONTRACT CLAUSES
For many years, insurers both in consumer and commercial insurance have made use of
basis  of  contract  clauses  to  convert  the  policyholder’s  answers  and  declarations  into
contractual  warranties.44 The  practice  empowers  the  insurers  to  refuse  claims  when  the
policyholder makes a mistake in answering the questions, no matter how minor or immaterial
the mistake might be. This is because when the answers are declared to be the basis of the
contract, this mean that their truth is made a condition, exact fulfilment of which is rendered
by stipulation as essential  to its  enforceability.45 It has been often suggested that basis of
contract  clauses  operate  as  traps,46 and  their  removal  from  the  legal  landscape  was
41  This is endorsed by s. 17(5) of the Act which stipulates that the insured will not be able to rely on any failure
by the insurer to draw a disadvantageous term to its attention if the assured (or its agent) had actual knowledge
of the disadvantageous term at the time the contract was entered into.  
42  Insurance Contract Law: Business Disclosure; Warranties; Insurer’s Remedies for Fraudulent Claims; and 
Late Payment, Cm 8898, SG/2014/131, at para. 29.50.
43  Section 17(4) of the Insurance Act 2015. 
44  This is done typically by the policyholder signing a statement on the proposal form stating that his answers
form the basis of the contract.
45  Dawsons v. Bonnin [1922] 2 A.C. 413, at 425, per Viscount Haldane. 
46  Zurich General Accident & Liability Ins Co Ltd v. Morrison [1942] 2 K.B. 53, 58, per Lord Greene, MR.
recommended by the Law Commission back in 1980.47 The Consumer Insurance (Disclosure
and  Representations)  Act  2012  abolished  basis  of  the  contract  clauses  in  consumer
insurance.48 
Section 9 of the Insurance Act 2015 is designed to ensure that non-consumer insurance
contracts follow suit; and the use of a term in a proposal form, contract or accompanying
document which states that the policyholder warrants the accuracy of the statements given or
that the answers form the basis of the contract is prohibited. This will prevent presentations
made at  the pre-contractual  stage to be converted  into warranties  by means  of a  general
declaration on a proposal form. The objective here is promoting transparency and insuring
that  the assured appreciates what type  of undertaking he is committing himself  to. Some
might  suggest  that  particularly  in  the  context  of  commercial  and  marine  insurance,  the
assureds are often large corporations which will  have the backing of a professional  legal
team, so it is a slim possibility that they will be caught by such clauses. That is correct to a
certain extent, but large corporations are not the only purchaser of business insurance. When
it comes to small corporations, it is not an overstatement to suggest that most would not be in
a position to appreciate the legal significance of such clauses. Besides, the proposed change
does not amount to an enormous restriction on freedom of contract. It will still be possible for
the insurer to include specific warranties of fact in a policy dealing with similar issues to
matters dealt with in the application form. Therefore, if answers given at the pre-contractual
stage  are  particularly  important  to  the  insurers,  the  proposed  reform  does  not  prevent
appropriate warranties from being included in the main body of the insurance policy.     
VI. CONCLUSION
At the outset, two positive aspects of the reform carried out in this area of law should be
stressed.  First,  it  is  praiseworthy that  the  Insurance  Act  2015 aspires  to  provide  a  more
holistic  approach  to  risk  control  clauses  by  extending  the  scope  of  the  reform  beyond
warranties as traditionally understood. It goes without saying that this imposes a restriction
on freedom of contract to a certain extent; but any possible adverse effect of such restriction
especially in non-consumer insurance contracts has been limited by allowing parties to those
contracts to contract out of the default regime subject to transparency requirements. Second,
the Law Commissions’ stance on not allowing insurers to contract out of the default regime
set out in ss. 10 and 11 of the Act in consumer insurance contracts is justifiable, given that
there is a huge imbalance in terms of bargaining power of consumer assureds and insurers,
and the former—often not assisted by a broker—is not in a situation to appreciate the precise
impact of legal jargon incorporated into standard contracts.49                  
47 Law Commission,  Insurance Law—Non-Disclosure and Breach of  Warranty:  Law Com No. 104 (Cmnd
8064, 1980), para. 7.5.   
48  See, s. 6(2) of the 2012 Act.
49  A different regime in relation to warranties has been in application for a considerable amount of time in the
context of consumer insurance. For instance, the Financial Conduct Authority Handbook: Conduct of Business
soucebook (ICOBS)  provides  a  regulatory safeguard  in  relation  to  warranties  for  consumers.  ICOBS 8.1.2
states: “A rejection of a consumer policyholders’ claim is unreasonable, except where there is evidence of fraud,
if it is … (3) for breach of warranty or condition unless the circumstances of the claim are connected to the
breach…”. This provision is designed to offer a different and more assured friendly regime for consumers; and
even though it cannot be applied in court, it is possible for a consumer to bring action for an insurer that acts
contrary to this rule for breach of statutory duty under s. 138 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (as
amended).  In  similar  fashion,  the  Financial  Ombudsman  Service  (FSO),  which  has  jurisdiction  to  hear
Turning to potential impact of the changes introduced on law and practice, the following
observations are in order. There is little doubt that the significance of insurance warranties in
insurance practice will diminish in future. That is because classifying a risk control clause as
a  “warranty”  will  not  anymore  provide  a  very  powerful  statutory  remedy  for  insurers.
However,  considering  that  warranties  have  been  embedded  into  insurance  practice  for
centuries, it will be premature to suggest that they will be removed from the legal landscape
altogether.  Also,  it  is  possible  that  in  the  context  of  commercial  insurance  the  present
warranty regime will be retained for some risks, given that it is possible to contract out of the
new default regime. It is very difficult at this stage to predict to what extent the insurers will
opt  to  contract  out  of  the  provisions  of  the  Insurance  Act  2015.  The  transparency
requirements  will  increase  administrative  costs  for  those  who  decide  to  opt  out.  More
significantly, opting out of the default regime might create a reputational hazard for insurers
by sending a wrong type of message to the market. 
When it comes to determining how effective the proposals will be in reducing the
transaction and legal costs, this is not an easy question to answer, either. Under the current
legal regime, disputes centre around two questions: i) whether a term is a warranty or not50
and ii) if so, what the scope of the warranty is.51 Assimilating the legal regime concerning
insurance  warranties  with  other  terms  dealing  with  risk  control  (e.g.,  exclusion  clauses,
condition  precedents)  will  certainly help to reduce litigation  on demarcation  of insurance
terms; but as highlighted earlier, litigation will be inevitable on issues concerning whether a
term tends to reduce the risk of a particular loss or it is a term defining the risk generally. Put
differently,  whilst  the  proposed  changes  will  likely  reduce  disputes  concerning
characterisation and interpretation of warranties, it is very likely that the battleground will
shift to issues concerning what particular objective the warranty (or term) intends to serve.
Only  time  will  show  whether  the  changes  introduced  will  amount  to  a  net  decrease  in
litigation costs. One should also not lose sight of the fact that one-off transitional costs of
familiarisation will be associated with any law reform.    
Considering the substance of the changes introduced, it is beyond doubt that for the
case of breach of a risk control clause, more balanced remedies have been introduced by the
2015 Act as opposed to the current legal regime. However, in advancing this agenda it is
inevitable that some sacrifices need to be made from certainty. It has been highlighted in this
article that s. 11 is likely to be a source of uncertainty and, although the Law Commissions
complaints from consumers and micro-businesses, has often overruled an insurer’s decision to reject a claim
where the breach the insurer relied on did not cause the loss in question. The Insurance Act 2015 will afford a
similar protection to consumers which can be enforced not only by the FSO but also by courts. 
50 See, for example, Kler Knitwear Ltd v. Lombard General Insurance Co Ltd [2000] Lloyd’s Rep. I.R. 47.
51  In  many cases,  the courts have used interpretative principles to relieve the harsh effects of the warranty
regime. See, Hide v. Bruce (1779) 3 Doug KB 213. Saville, LJ, in Hussain v. Brown [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 627,
630, said: “… it must be remembered that a continuing warranty is a draconian term. As I have noted, the breach
of such a warranty produces an automatic cancellation of cover, and the fact that a loss may have no connection
at all with the breach is simply irrelevant. In my view, if the underwriters want such a protection, then it is up to
them to stipulate for it in clear terms.” More recently, see Pratt v. Aigaion Insurance Co SA [2008] EWCA Civ.
1314; [2009] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 225 and Sugar Hut Group Ltd and Others v.  Great Lakes Reinsurance (UK) plc
[2010] EWHC 2636 (Comm); [2011] Lloyd's Rep. I.R. 198.   
have developed this provision with a view to avoiding negative effects of a causation test, it
is very likely that this provision will re-introduce causation into the enquiry from the back-
door.               
These difficulties aside, it  is fair to say that the changes introduced will achieve a
fairer  regime in domestic  insurance markets  for risk control  clauses akin to the solutions
adopted  by  most  continental  legal  systems.  When  it  comes  to  international  insurance
business,  such as marine,  transport,  aviation and reinsurance,  introducing a more assured
friendly regime will increase confidence in the UK law and possibly present a very effective
weapon to London brokers who are currently facing tough competition from other emerging
international  insurance markets.  It  is  too early to  speculate  about  potential  impact  of  the
changes in the market, but the author is of the view that the changes introduced are built on
solid  theoretical  foundations  and  they  seem  to  enjoy  the  support  of  a  majority  of  the
stakeholders in the market.52 There is every reason to be hopeful of the future.        
  
52 See, Insurance Contract Law: Business Disclosure; Warranties; Insurer’s Remedies for Fraudulent Claims;
and Late Payment, Cm 8898, SG/2014/131, at pp. 167–170. 
